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Abstract: An outbreak of cryptosporidiosis occurred in the town of North Battleford, Saskatchewan, Canada in the spring of 2001. The 
outbreak left thousands of people sick including about 50 people hospitalized. The source of the outbreak was from the city’s surface 
water treatment plant. The Sedimentation Contact Unit did not satisfactorily remove suspended solids from the source water, resulting in 
ﬁlter breakthrough. Contaminated water was released into the distribution system causing the outbreak. Communication breakdown and 
confusion exacerbated the situation, extending the duration of the outbreak. The outbreak prompted the province to change the way it 
regulated municipal utilities of water and wastewater. 
CE Database subject headings: Water treatment plants; Environmental issues; Case reports; Pathogens; Canada. 
Introduction 
This paper is a summary of an environmental failure case study 
that took place in Northwest Saskatchewan, Canada where a 
Cryptosporidium outbreak occurred in the spring of 2001. Many 
(5,800–7,100) people became ill due to the event (Stirling et al. 
2001a, b). An inquiry (Laing 2002) was formed immediately after 
this event to “report on, and make ﬁndings and recommendations 
regarding the circumstances that led to contamination, adequacy 
and effectiveness of actions taken by ofﬁcials, effects of regula­
tions, bylaws, policies, guidelines, and procedures on this occur­
rence, and other matters relevant to assure safe drinking water in 
the future.” The outbreak itself had some possible causes: inad­
equate facility planning, antiquated technology, ineffective man­
agement, and communication. These causes have been examined 
in detail, but it is important to note that the outbreak was entirely 
preventable. It is also important to understand that a combination 
of causes was required for this outbreak to occur. 
Description of North Battleford 
The City of North Battleford is located in Northwest 
Saskatchewan on the North Saskatchewan River. It is a small 
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town with a population of 15,000. North Battleford is located 
north of the river while Battleford lies on the south side. The two 
towns have separate treatment systems for wastewater and water. 
The local economy is based mostly upon agriculture and has suf­
fered with declining meat prices. The population is relatively 
static but the demographic is changing. The numbers of children 
and retired people are increasing while working age people are 
leaving (http://www.cityofnb.ca 2006). Likewise, the depressed 
economy has resulted in less local government revenue. Life on 
the high plains can be very tough due to extremes in weather and 
this takes a toll on a city’s infrastructure. Maintenance of an aging 
city is always difﬁcult, but it is even more difﬁcult without a 
robust tax base. 
The North Saskatchewan River is very important in this case 
study and deserves more detail. Its headwaters are in the Rocky 
Mountains of Alberta. The river ﬂows east through the city of 
Edmonton and through the prairie into Saskatchewan. The Battle­
ford’s area is not far from the provincial border. Flow rates range 
from a low point in the winter of 100 m3 / s to 800 m3 / s for peak 
ﬂows in late spring/summer when the river is swollen by snow-
melt. Agriculture such as cattle farming occurs in the watershed, 
which has a signiﬁcant impact on water quality (Laing 2002). 
Cryptosporidiosis 
The City of North Battleford experienced an outbreak of 
cryptosporidiosis during the spring of 2001. Cryptosporidiosis is 
caused by the protozoan parasite Cryptosporidium parvum and 
inﬂicts its host with symptoms of diarrhea, abdominal cramps, 
vomiting, and headaches. There is no known cure or treatment for 
this infection. Healthy or immunocompetent people will ﬁght 
the parasite in 10–14 days (Finch and Belosevic 2001; 
O’Donoghue 1995). However, cryptosporidiosis can be a chronic 
condition and sometimes deadly for people with weakened im­
mune systems. The real danger to the host lies in dehydration that 
occurs with diarrhea. The most well known outbreak of 
cryptosporidiosis occurred in Milwaukee in 1993. In this catas­
trophe, about 400,000 people became ill and 100 people died 
(Peterson 2004). 
Cryptosporidium parvum is a gastrointestinal parasite and is 
spread through fecal material (Finch and Belosevic 2001; Hsu 
et al. 2001; O’Donoghue 1995). The parasite is transported by a 
robust environmental vehicle called an oocyst. The oocyst leaves 
the parent host with fecal material. Next, the oocyst is ingested 
by mouth and enters the digestive system of the new host. This 
typically is done through poor sanitation such as dirty hands and 
contaminated food and water. The oocyst breaks down in the 
digestive system of the new host and settles in the small intestine 
where growth, reproduction, and oocyst formation occur 
(O’Donoghue 1995). The time between infection and oocyst 
excretion can range from 2 to 14 days (O’Donoghue 1995). At  
this point, the host displays symptoms of cryptosporidiosis. 
The oocyst stage of cryptosporidium’s lifecycle presents a 
challenge to water treatment (Hsu et al. 2001; Medema et al. 
1998; Peeters et al. 1989; Searcy et al. 2005). Similar to Giardia 
spp., this cyst is quite resistant to conventional water treatment. 
The oocyst consists of a matrix of glycoproteins and sugar mol­
ecules that are strongly resistant to conventional disinfectants 
such as chlorine (O’Donoghue 1995; Searcy et al. 2005). While 
disinfection with chlorine is very effective against bacteria, it is 
relatively ineffective for inactivating Cryptosporidium. Another 
characteristic and problem with the oocyst is its size. Oocysts are 
very small and average 5 fm but have been known to pass 
through ﬁlters of 1 fm (Finch and Belosevic 2001; Medema et al. 
1998). However, oocysts are known to be attracted to particles 
and are removed by ﬂocculation/sedimentation in conventional 
water treatment (Fewtrell et al. 2001; Searcy et al. 2005). 
Cryptosporidium parvum affects many animals including ﬁsh, 
reptiles, birds, and mammals. There are two genotypes that infect 
humans. They are referred to as genotypes 1 and 2. Genotype 1 is 
human speciﬁc and can only be spread by humans to other hu­
mans. The most common example is drinking water contaminated 
with sewage. Genotype 2 is carried by and primarily effects mam­
mals, but this genotype can infect people. It is associated with 
agricultural runoff, cattle, and sheep in particular (O’Donoghue 
1995). In the cryptosporidiosis outbreak of North Battleford, 12 
samples from ill people were tested for genotype. Eleven samples 
were conﬁrmed to be the human-derived genotype 1 and the 
twelfth sample was unknown. These results helped in determining 
the contamination source of the outbreak (Laing 2002). 
Description of Facilities 
Water and wastewater treatment facilities of North Battleford in­
clude a sewage plant and two water treatment plants. The primary 
water treatment plant is a groundwater source plant while the 
second one, the surface water plant, uses the North Saskatchewan 
River as its source. The wastewater treatment plant is 3.5 km 
upstream of the intake for the surface water plant. Dye tests from 
1992 have shown that the wastewater efﬂuent plume runs close to 
the surface water intake (Laing 2002). It is reasonable to assume 
that the plume changes with river ﬂow and a portion of this plume 
may enter the surface water plant intake. 
A description of the wastewater treatment plant (WWTP) can 
be summarized from the North Battleford Water Inquiry, Com­
missioner Robert D. Laing (Laing 2002). The WWTP is a two 
stage activated sludge plant that was built in 1957 and has gone 
through several renovations and additions. First, the water passes 
through a bar screen to remove large objects followed by a grit 
chamber. Next, the water enters one of two primary settling tanks. 
Secondary treatment begins when the water is fed to an aero­
accelerator followed by a secondary settling tank. Finally, treated 
water is passed into a chlorine contact chamber for disinfection 
before discharge to the river. The plant has a capacity to treat 
5,455 to5,910 L /min while inﬂow rates range from 1,818 to 
4,546 L / min. Plant capacity can become exceeded during periods 
of heavy precipitation when the storm sewers are overwhelmed. 
When this happens, excess sanitary sewage bypasses treatment 
and discharges into the river. This is said to occur about twice a 
year (Laing 2002). 
The primary water treatment plant for North Battleford uses 
groundwater as its source. The groundwater plant was built in the 
1940s and runs continuously. Wells provide the source water that 
is ﬁltered, treated to remove iron and manganese, and ﬁnally, 
disinfected. The groundwater plant provides 55 to 75% of the 
city’s drinking water, but this continually varies. The years prior 
to the outbreak had seen a decline in the amount of water coming 
from groundwater. When demand surpasses the groundwater plant 
capacity, the surface water treatment plant is run to supplement 
this need. The surface water plant does not run continuously and 
runs 8 –16 hours a day when in use (Laing 2002). 
The surface water treatment plant was built in 1950 and has 
undergone numerous additions and renovations. A schematic dia­
gram of the surface water treatment plant can be seen in Fig. 1. 
The raw water source is the river, which is pumped through sand 
separators on its way to the solid contacts unit (SCU) or sedimen­
tation tank. Between the sand separators and the SCU, coagulants 
are added to initiate the process of coagulation, ﬂocculation, and 
sedimentation. These chemicals consist of aluminum sulfate 
(Alum), polyaluminum chloride (Aluminex 3), potassium per­
manganate, and chlorine. Potassium permanganate is used to oxi­
dize organic material. Gaseous chlorine is added at this point to 
prevent growth in the SCU and to increase chlorine contact time. 
Lime and polymer are added directly to the SCU and agitation is 
introduced. Polymer is added to assist in ﬂocculation while lime 
is added to increase pH. A pH around 7 is preferred to prevent 
corrosion of equipment and pipes. The SCU is arguably the most 
important section of the plant. The SCU holds nearly 700,000 L 
of water and agitation is provided by a turbine mixer with a 
variable speed drive. Coagulation, ﬂocculation, and sedimentation 
processes are critical for removing suspended solids from raw 
water (Fewtrell et al. 2001; Hsu and Yeh 2003; Searcy et al., 
2005). Settling rates for North Battleford’s SCU are typically 10 
to 20%. Water proceeds from the SCU to one of two banks of 
dual media (sand and anthracite) ﬁlters and then clearwells. Fi­
nally, treated water enters the distribution system from the clear-
wells (Laing 2002). 
Government and Agencies Involved 
While an engineering failure caused the outbreak, confusion and 
communication breakdown resulted in an extended exposure of 
the public to Cryptosporidium oocysts. At the local government 
level, it has been assessed that personnel instability, insufﬁcient 
budget, and a lack of effective communication with the regulatory 
branch of Saskatchewan Environment and Resource Management 
(SERM) contributed to this incident (Laing 2002). 
Two government agencies are critical for public health con­
cerning public sanitation: SERM and the Battlefords Public 
Health District. SERM was the regulatory agency in charge of 
making sure that plants in the province performed according to 
Fig. 1. Process diagram of North Battleford’s surface water plant during Cryptosporidium outbreak 
regulations. Similar to the town of North Battleford, SERM went 
through a restructuring plan to reduce bureaucratic costs in 1993 
(Laing 2002). The critical change was that actual or physical in­
spections of wastewater and drinking water plants were discon­
tinued. At the time of the outbreak, a physical inspection of the 
surface water plant had not taken place since 1991. In small mu­
nicipalities, such as North Battleford, the burden of monitoring 
public works was left to the town. If conditions or an event oc­
curred that could harm public safety, it was to the responsibility 
of the municipality to notify SERM. 
The Battlefords Health District monitors public health and in­
vestigates possible illness outbreaks. It was the health district and 
associated medical community that discovered a possible out­
break of cryptosporidiosis was occurring. This was not an easy 
feat considering that cryptosporidiosis is largely under-reported. 
Conﬁrmation of the illness requires a stool sample of the infected 
person as well as 5–7 days to acquire results. In addition, the 
medical community is not trained in the pathology of engineering 
and public works functions. Nevertheless, vigilant public health 
ofﬁcials noticed a health problem and asked questions, which 
eventually led to the cause of the outbreak (Laing 2002). 
Previous Problems 
The outbreak of cryptosporidiosis that occurred in March and 
April 2001 was not the ﬁrst time waterborne illness had been 
found in North Battleford. Isolated cases of cryptosporidiosis oc­
curred in 1994 through 1998 and coliform bacteria were found in 
the distribution system in September 2000. The sources of these 
cases were never discovered. Cryptosporidium parvum is a difﬁ­
cult organism to test for and just because it was not found in tests 
does not mean oocysts were not present. The conventional testing 
method for cryptosporidiosis is known as the ICR method and 
requires very large sample volumes such as 100 L (Hsu et al. 
2001). Obviously, source water from a large river with sewage 
efﬂuent upstream is a source of concern. Madore et al. (1987) 
North Battleford’s coliform contamination event in September 
2000 in combination with a bacterial outbreak in Walkerton, On­
tario in May 2000 that caused the death of seven people should 
have increased concern for public safety (Hrudley et al. 2003; 
O’Connor 2002). Coliform bacteria are easier to test for and treat 
than Cryptosporidium oocysts. North Battleford’s coliform bacte­
ria contamination event began with a positive sample found in a 
dead end section of the distribution system where ﬂow was mini­
mal. Further investigation found that chlorine residual levels were 
below regulatory levels of 0.5 mg /L and had been, at various 
intervals, for years due to residential complaints of stained laun­
dry. Chlorine oxidizes manganese (Mn) and iron (Fe), which are 
commonly found in groundwater. Oxidized Mn and Fe turn 
treated water brown and can stain clothing. After this event, 
SERM requested a hydrology study of the distribution system, a 
quality assurance response plan, and an evaluation of the surface 
water plant. These were not done by the time the outbreak oc­
curred (Laing 2002). 
Contamination Event 
The event responsible for the cryptosporidium outbreak occurred 
on March 20, 2001 when the surface water plant was shut down 
for planned maintenance. The SCU was completely drained, re­
paired, and cleaned. There was a crack in the ﬂoor of the SCU 
that needed patching and a complete cleaning of the SCU was 
performed. Shutdown procedures usually left residual amounts of 
the sludge blanket in the tank for restarting the sedimentation 
process (Laing 2002). After the work was completed, the plant 
was started up again late in the afternoon. The SCU was ﬁlled up 
again, necessary chemicals were added, and ﬁnished water was 
discarded or run to waste. The water was run to waste until a 
turbidity of 5 NTUs and a free chlorine concentration of 2 mg /L 
was observed. It was assumed that the ﬁlters could effectively 
remove suspended solids if ﬁnished water met this speciﬁcation. 
This took about 3.5 hours and afterwards water was run to the 
found average sewage efﬂuent from activated sludge plants con­
tain 1,400 to 40,000 oocysts per 100 L. 
two banks of dual media ﬁlters and ultimately to the clearwells. 
Data show that at this time turbidity was 2.29 NTU and free 
chlorine was 2.15 mg / L. It is important to note that shut downs in 
previous years ran ﬁnished SCU water to waste for 10 hours to 
1.5 days (Laing 2002). 
Evidence from the North Battleford water inquiry shows while 
turbidities were relatively low, sedimentation was not occurring. 
Coagulant and polymer levels were increased to no avail. In fact, 
ﬁnished water leaving the SCU sometimes had higher turbidities 
than the raw water source. Breakthrough of the ﬁlters occurred 
relatively quickly and the ﬁlters had to be backwashed. Water 
from backwashing and during the ﬁlter ripening stage should have 
been run to waste but was not. This represents a major problem 
because particulates and contaminants trapped in the ﬁlters were 
now being agitated free and released into the clearwells. Rapid 
ﬁlter breakthrough reduced the efﬁcacy of sedimentation and ﬁl­
tration. Low sedimentation percentage was noted and bentonite 
was bought to help form a ﬂoc blanket (Laing 2002). 
The surface water plant was run every day until April 25. April 
25 was the day a health crisis was realized and a precautionary 
drinking water advisory (PDWA) was issued. Water was being fed 
to the distribution system even though settling percentages in the 
SCU were unacceptable and ﬁnal turbidities in the clearwells 
were sometimes above 0.3 NTU. A very important point made 
later by investigators is that these ﬁnal turbidities are a combina­
tion of water passing through two different banks of ﬁlters. It was 
not possible to see if water from ﬁlters 1 and 2 were performing 
worse than ﬁlters 3 and 4. However, a study from an engineering 
consultant years before showed that the ﬁlter bank consisting of 
ﬁlters 1 and 2 did not perform as well as ﬁlters 3 and 4. 
Even though the city was having signiﬁcant problems with 
their water treatment, SERM and the Battlefords Health District 
were not notiﬁed. The outbreak was discovered by health profes­
sionals who, like other residents, did not know there was a prob­
lem with the drinking water. Many of these health professionals 
and their families experienced cryptosporidiosis themselves. The 
ﬁrst known case was identiﬁed and reported to the health district 
on April 4, 2001, with the second case being reported a day later. 
A family doctor discovered unusually high sales of diarrhea medi­
cations at a local pharmacy and informed the health district ad­
ministrator. At this point, the administrator, who was also a 
practicing doctor at the Battlefords Union Hospital, ordered stool 
samples for all patients coming in because of diarrhea. On April 
24, the administrator, realizing a possible outbreak was present, 
asked a public health inspector to ask the Director of Public 
Works and Engineering of North Battleford if there were any 
problems with water treatment. The director admitted there was a 
problem getting an effective ﬂoc blanket in the surface water 
plant, but that it was not a safety concern. However, the public 
health ofﬁcer for the province concluded, due to recent problems 
with North Battleford’s water supply, that a waterborne source 
was most likely the problem (Laing 2002). The following day, 
April 25, the local SERM ofﬁcial was notiﬁed of the problem. 
The local SERM ofﬁcial reviewed the information and advised a 
PDWA immediately. A day later, a boil water order was issued 
due to the lack of settling in the SCU (Laing 2002). 
Health Canada extrapolated known results during their epide­
miological investigation and estimated 5,800 to 7,100 people de­
veloped cryptosporidiosis. Fortunately, no one died but 50 people 
were hospitalized (Stirling et al. 2001a, b). In addition, the out­
break affected people not necessarily living in the Battlefords 
area. Many people simply traveling through and unlucky enough 
to have a drink of water became ill. The outbreak peaked on April 
13, 2001 and quickly dropped once the PDWA was issued on 
April 25. Spatial regression also showed that residents living to­
wards the southeast part of North Battleford’s water distribution 
system were two to four times more likely to become ill than 
residents living on the northwest side of town (Stirling et al. 
2001a, b). The southeast side of North Battleford is where water 
from the surface water plant enters the distribution system while 
the groundwater plant feeds the northwest section, even though 
the water from both plants mixes. 
Remediation 
The epidemiological investigation showed that the outbreak 
ended in May. However, the boil water order (BWO) remained in 
place until July 25, 2001. With the surface water plant’s troubled 
history, the removal of the BWO was cautiously slow. A physical 
plant inspection was executed and a report generated. A procedure 
for removing the BWO was not approved until June 19, 2001. 
This procedure required the city to show the treatment process 
was working safely and required the city to design a plan to 
prevent the problem from reoccurring (Laing 2002). 
North Battleford hired a consulting engineering ﬁrm to de­
sign and implement changes for safe drinking water. At the 
time this paper was written, the same consultant was still 
employed by the city (http://www.cityofnb.ca/noticeﬁles/2549_ 
DRINKINGWATERReport2005.pdf 2006). The changes made 
are illustrated in Fig. 2. Possibly, the most important engineering 
change was adding new valves and pipes so water could be run to 
waste. These critical valves were added at the SCU and the ﬁlter 
banks. Sampling sites were added after the ﬁlter runs to allow for 
manual water collection and continuous monitoring of turbidity 
and particulates. Coagulant chemicals were added at the sand 
separators for better mixing. UV disinfection units were added 
after both ﬁlter banks. UV light has been shown to be more ef­
fective than chemicals for inactivating Cryptosporidium oocysts 
(Finch and Belosevic 2001). Chlorine disinfection was moved to 
the clearwells instead of before the SCU. Chlorination units 
would also be installed for the town’s water supply reservoirs 
within the distribution system. Chlorine disinfection was in­
creased at the sewage plant for the purpose of treating bypass 
sewage. Finally, standard operating procedures (SOPs) were 
added for the purposes of quality assurance. The new SOPs called 
for the surface water plant to shut down or run water to waste 
when the following occur: 
1. Sewage bypass events; 
2. Chlorination malfunction; 
3. Malfunction in the SCU; and 
4. Finished water with a turbidity greater than 0.3 NTU. 
The remediation solution is a long-term plan concerning 
the groundwater plant, sewage plant, and the surface water 
plant. While all the plants are antiquated, the sewage plant 
and surface water plants should be abandoned for new plants. 
In 2005, there was only one positive sample for Cryptospori­
dium occurring in the raw source water and no oocysts were 
found in ﬁnished water (http://www.cityofnb.ca/noticeﬁles/2549_ 
DRINKINGWATERReport2005.pdf 2006). However, common 
sense dictates that a water intake for drinking water should not 
occur immediately downstream from sewage efﬂuent. In addition, 
raw source water should come from a protected watershed, not 
from a large turbid waterway downstream from cities and agricul­
tural areas. 
A multibarrier approach as presented by Finch and Belosevic 
(2001) is especially important for treating raw source water 
known for harboring Cryptosporidium. First, the watershed 
Fig. 2. Process diagram of North Battleford’s surface water treatment plant postremediation 
should be protected from intensive agriculture. Second, microor­
ganisms such as Cryptosporidium and Giardia should be treated 
like particles, as they are best removed via ﬂocculation and sedi­
mentation. Evidence exists that Cryptosporidium oocysts have an 
afﬁnity towards particulates and, thus, the sedimentation process 
is an effective method to remove them (Medema et al. 1998; 
Searcy et al. 2005). Finally, a good disinfection procedure incor­
porating both oxidation and UV light is needed. Chlorine is 
needed to kill bacteria and UV light is needed to inactivate oo­
cysts. A point that SERM makes is that the multibarrier approach 
and ﬁnished water speciﬁcations should be customized for each 
plant as each plant design varies, just like raw source water. 
The cryptosporidiosis outbreak of North Battleford had a dra­
matic effect upon SERM. In 2002, many recommendations of the 
North Battleford water inquiry were implemented. These are list­
ed in a publication released by SERM (http://www.se.gob.sk.ca/ 
environment/production/water/Drinking%20Water%20brochure. 
pdf 2006). Some of the changes include: 
1.	 Increased funding for the regulatory branch of SERM as well 
as more personnel. 
2.	 At least one inspection of drinking water and sewage plants 
per year. 
3.	 Plant operators must be certiﬁed. 
4.	 Plant owners must notify SERM when chlorine levels are 
low and when equipment breaks down. 
5.	 Watershed planning will be used to protect source water from 
contamination. 
Conclusions 
The Cryptosporidium outbreak of North Battleford was prevent­
able. Essentially, personnel and government policies manifested 
themselves in the engineering failure, which resulted in illness. 
mon problem, i.e., organizational restructuring and cost cutting, 
which went too far (Laing 2002). 
In the 1990s, SERM went through restructuring and budget 
cuts, which reduced the number of auditors and physical in­
spections. A risk assessment model was used to determine 
where problems could arise. Effective use of this model favors 
larger municipalities and urban areas. Another point made in 
the North Battleford water inquiry is that there are many 
small communities like North Battleford all across North America 
that need closer attention by SERM or appropriate regulatory 
agencies. Naturally, this requires greater resources for regulatory 
agencies (http://www.se.gob.sk.ca/environment/production/water/ 
Drinking%20Water%20brochure.pdf 2006). 
Technically, the greatest issue appears to be a lack of commu­
nication when the SCU was malfunctioning. The local govern­
ment, “faced with monetary constraints,” was reluctant to spend 
money on improvements for public works unless forced to. The 
North Battleford water inquiry recommended a proactive ap­
proach for utility remediation using funding from increased water 
rates for customers and ﬁnancial assistance from provincial as 
well as federal authorities (Laing 2002). The solutions to avoid 
such an incident lie in having management that emphasizes sound 
technical practices, optimum allocation of resources, and better 
communication among all government agencies. Budget con­
straints are always a major concern and smaller towns are becom­
ing increasingly short of funds, as their economies are generally 
shrinking. The access to funds for small towns such as the Battle-
fords area is critical and requires support from the provincial and 
federal governments. 
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